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ABSTRACT 
 
The opportunity structure facing waged agricultural workers seeking 
basic statutory employment rights in the Canadian province of Alberta is hostile, 
reflecting the intertwined political and economic interests of farmers, the 
provincial government, and agribusiness. This article outlines the contours of the 
political opportunities and constraints facing labour groups and agricultural 
workers seeking legislative change. Analysis suggests there is little opportunity 
at present to alter this legislative exclusion.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
aged agricultural workers in Alberta face hazardous working 
conditions and below-average wages. They are also almost 
entirely excluded from the statutory framework regulating 
employment relationships—a framework that many labour advocates assert 
could improve their wages and working conditions. This degree of exclusion is 
exceptional, even among Canadian agricultural workers. These long-term 
economic and legal inequities have yet to spark significant collective resistance 
among these workers. Labour groups have also been unable to achieve even 
modest gains for these workers.  
The development of social movements as a vehicle of collective worker 
resistance is typically understood in the sociological literature via analysis of the 
political opportunities, mobilization structures and framing processes available 
to aggrieved individuals and groups. This study seeks to identify the political 
opportunities and constraints facing those seeking the basic statutory 
employment rights for waged agricultural workers. The findings suggest that 
long-term hostility in the structure of political opportunities is a significant 
barrier to legislative change. 
W
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While explicating the opportunity structure provides only a partial 
understanding of the potential for worker resistance, the political opportunities 
and constraints appear to significantly affect the way in (and degree to) which 
social movements develop and construct meaning. Consequently, this study 
provides a useful basis for further research into the mobilization structures and 
framing processes of waged agricultural workers in Alberta. It also serves as a 
starting point for subsequent inter-jurisdictional differences and similarities in 
the awarding of statutory employment rights to farm workers. 
 
WAGED AGRICULTURAL WORK IN ALBERTA 
 
In 2006, the majority of Alberta’s 49,431 farms were family-operated sole 
proprietorships or partnerships (Canada, 2006a). Only 697 farms were classified 
as non-family corporations, although over half of all “family farms” had capital 
valued over $500,000, 40% had capital of over $1 million, and nearly 20% had 
capital over $2 million. Thirty-five percent of farms reported paid labour, with 
18% reporting year-round paid labour and 22% reporting seasonal or temporary 
paid labour (Alberta, 2007a).  These aggregate statistics obscure the level of paid 
agricultural work because the data does not distinguish family wage earners 
from non-family wage earners. Overall, the trend appears to be towards fewer 
paid workers, perhaps suggesting some combination of capital substitution, 
shifts towards less labour-intensive commodities, and work intensification. 
Again, these aggregate statistics may mask divergent trends between large and 
small operations.  
The wage structure of agricultural employment in Alberta is largely 
unstudied, but general farm workers earned an average of $13.13 per hour with a 
46.6-hour work week in 2007, significantly below the average Alberta wage rate 
of $23.90 per hour (Alberta, 2008a). Agricultural work remains a hazardous 
occupation, with 3170 injuries reported in Alberta during 2006 (Alberta, 2007b, 
see also Picket, Hartling, Brison, and Guernset, 1999; Canadian Agricultural 
injury Surveillance Program, 2003). It is not possible to disentangle worker 
versus operator injuries within Alberta and different agricultural profiles also 
confound inter-provincial comparisons that might shed light on the effect of 
occupational health and safety legislation. The federal agriculture census (i.e., 
self-reports) found almost double the number of injuries as provincial 
government monitoring of hospital admissions, likely reflecting definitional and 
monitoring system differences (Alberta, 2007b). 
The Alberta Federation of Labour (AFL) calculates there are 
approximately 12,000 waged agricultural workers in Alberta, with 2600 working 
in a temporary or seasonal capacity (Alberta Federation of Labour, 2008). Waged 
workers represent approximately 23% of agricultural and horticultural workers 
in Alberta (Alberta, 2008b). The number of foreign migratory labourers is small. 
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For example, 563 general farm workers and 263 workers in food, beverage and 
tobacco processing entered the Alberta labour market through the Seasonal 
Agricultural Worker (SAW) program in 2005 (Canada, 2006b). As discussed 
below, the use of temporary foreign workers may in fact mean there is a much 
larger pool of foreign workers. 
Agricultural workers perform work on both farms and ranches as well as 
in mushroom factories, greenhouses, nurseries and sod farms. The exact 
distribution of workers among firms is unknown, although the majority of 
workers are involved in animal production, such as hog barns and ranches. The 
government predicts the surplus of agricultural and horticultural workers to 
grow from 2,250 in 2006 to approximately 6,400 by 2016 (Alberta, 2008b). More 
migrant workers could significant increase this surplus, a strategy Alberta’s 
government is aggressively pursuing in other sectors.  
Waged agricultural workers comprise one (albeit heterogeneous) element 
of the structure of Canadian agriculture. John Shields (1992) asserts this structure 
has three distinct tiers: agribusiness (i.e., the suppliers of machinery and 
chemicals, and purchasers of products) is on the top, waged agricultural workers 
are on the bottom, and farmers are in the middle. Within this structure, 
individual producers compete among themselves as they purchase supplies and 
sell commodities to quasi-monopolies that set prices and limit farmers’ market 
power. In this dynamic, farmers often seek to maximize profitability by 
minimizing labour costs (see also Skogstad, 1987, 2007; Kelly, 1982). 
 
STATUTORY EXCLUSION OF FARM WORKERS 
 
The study is premised upon the view that capitalist states are subject to 
antagonisms between capital and labour. These are often seen in the workplace 
as contests over wages and control of work, but they operate more broadly in 
society as a tension between the imperatives of production and legitimacy. The 
state has developed, in part to manage this tension and ensure the capital 
accumulation process operates with minimal impediment (Mandel, 1992). The 
state’s policy options are limited by its need to maintain its political legitimacy 
among citizens (most of whom are workers).  Among state strategies for conflict 
management has been the enactment of labour and social policies and programs 
that assist with social reproduction by sustaining the general standard of living, 
education and health—thus ensuring an adequate labour force (Picchio, 1992).  
The state has legislated minimum labour and health and safety standards 
as well as injury compensation schemes and a framework regulating 
unionization and collective bargaining. Both domestically and internationally, 
these rights most often attach to workers in a standard employment 
relationships. Consequently, the statutory rights as well as social benefits granted 
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under this policy have gendered and racialized aspects, typically advantaging 
white males.  (Vosko, 2006, 2008).  
These basic statutory employment rights are not available to waged 
agricultural workers in Alberta. Human rights is an exception because it applies 
to “persons”, not “employees” or “workers” and thus has wider applicability 
than employment legislation. Instead, farm workers enter into common law 
employment contracts that impose differential rights and obligations on 
employers and employees that most scholars suggest significantly advantage 
employers (England, 2008). In Alberta, the exclusion of agricultural workers from 
statutory rights includes: 
 
• Employment Standards: Farm and ranch employees are not subject to 
minimum wage, hour of work, overtime, vacation pay, general holiday 
pay, rest periods and child labour provisions. Provisions regarding 
minimum termination notice and maternity and parental leave do 
operate (Alberta, 2007c). These exceptions affect employees employed on 
a farm or ranch whose employment is directly related to the primary 
production of eggs, milk, grain, seeds, fruit, vegetables, honey, livestock, 
game-production animals, poultry, bees or cultured fish. Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island exempt these workers 
from most standards. Other jurisdictions have exclusions, some of which 
operate only for small farms (Commission on Labour Cooperation, n.d.). 
 
• Labour Relations: Farm and ranch workers are excluded from labour 
legislation that regulates unionization and collective bargaining, thereby 
effectively precluding these activities by workers (Alberta, 2002). This 
exclusion mirrors that found in the Employment Standards Code, thereby 
excluding farms and ranches (including greenhouses producing 
vegetables and mushroom farms) but not other plant and flower growing 
operations. Alberta’s exclusion is broadly similar to Quebec’s (on farms 
ordinarily employing 3 or fewer workers) and New Brunswick (on farms 
with fewer than 5 employees). Following the Supreme Court’s Dunmore 
decision, Ontario’s Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 2002 provided 
workers with basic associational rights, but continued to exclude them 
from statutory access to collective bargaining (Tucker, 2006). In Fraser v. 
Ontario (Attorney General), this law was struck down by the Ontario 
Court of Appeal and the province given a year to determine the manner 
in which it wishes to statutorily protect the collective bargaining rights of 
agricultural workers. 
 
• Occupational Health and Safety: Farm and ranch workers are exempted 
from health and safety legislation by regulation (Alberta, 1995). Workers 
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involved in the production of crops, including fruits and vegetables, 
through the cultivation of land, the raising and maintenance of animals or 
birds, or the keeping of bees are excluded from occupational health and 
safety legislation. Workers in greenhouses, mushroom farms, nurseries, 
or sod farms are covered by the Act. Ontario brought farm workers under 
the ambit of its OHS legislation in 2006. 
 
• Workers’ Compensation: Workers’ compensation coverage is not 
mandatory for farm workers, although employers can purchase optional 
coverage (Alberta, 2007d). Workers whose employers do not voluntarily 
purchase workers’ compensation insurance are left to pursue recourse for 
injuries through the courts or private insurance schemes, routes 
employees have traditionally had difficulty accessing. 
 
While many provinces have similar exclusions for agricultural workers, 
few are as comprehensive in their exclusions as Alberta. Proponents of statutory 
inclusion typically assert that minimum standards and access to collective 
bargaining would improve the working conditions of farm workers. Three 
labour groups have campaigned for such inclusion over the past five years: 
The Farm Workers’ Union has made representations to the Alberta 
government and media comment, but comprises a single volunteer organizer, 
few members and has no representational capacity.  
The Alberta Federation of Labour (AFL) started a campaign for the 
legislative inclusion of farm workers in 2005. To date, this has entailed press 
releases, letters to the Minister, and advocacy during government consultations 
(Jason Foster, personal communication, 25 April 2008). The AFL has recently 
devoted significant efforts to the issue of temporary foreign workers (Alberta 
Federation of Labour, 2009), reflecting there are approximately 50,000 temporary 
foreign workers in Alberta versus only 12,000 farm workers.  
The United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) have gained modest 
associational rights and health and safety coverage in Ontario as well as 
employment standards coverage in Manitoba, but have no Alberta-specific 
organizing efforts underway (Stan Raper, personal communication, 22 April 
2008). Raper notes that an employer-friendly government, the geographical 
dispersion of workers, and lack of a farm workers’ organization in Alberta are 
significant impediments to any sort of effective organizational efforts. 
There has also been sporadic demand for better protection from 
agricultural workers and their families, often following a fatality. 
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SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
 
This study seeks to identify the political opportunities and constraints 
facing those seeking basic statutory employment rights for waged agricultural 
workers. The opportunity structure facing social movements is one of three sets 
of factors typically of interest to scholars examining social movements, the other 
two factors being mobilizing structures (i.e., informal and formal means by 
which individuals act collectively) and the framing process by which groups 
develop shared meanings and definitions, including a sense of cognitive 
liberation (i.e., that inequitable circumstances are susceptible to change). 
Focusing on the political opportunities for change reflects that political 
opportunities are a pre-requisite to change as well as influence the extent and 
form of that action (McAdams, McCarthy and Zaid, 1996; Buechler, 2000). 
Establishing the contours of the opportunity structure in Alberta is a 
useful precursor to studying the mobilization structures and framing processes 
that are at work. It also is a starting point for examining inter-jurisdictional 
differences and similarities as they affect the ability of marginalized workers to 
access statutory protections. Finally, outlining the intertwined political and 
economic relations that exist among key players in Alberta’s policy community 
informs discussion among labour and worker advocates about the potential 
effectiveness of different approaches.  
The literature suggests that four dimensions of the opportunity structure 
system warrant scrutiny: 
 
1. The degree of openness of the political system to the demands of 
agricultural workers. 
2. The (in)stability of the economic and political relationships among 
powerful actors in the policy community.  
3. The presence or absence of powerful allies. 
4. The state’s ability and willingness to repress dissent (McAdam, 1996; 
Jenkins, 1985; Jekins and Perrow, 1977; Jenkins and Klandermas, 1995; 
Kriesi, 1995). 
 
The interaction of these variables is posited to at least partially explain the 
timing and outcome of social movement activity, as well as the form of the 
movement. Relatively unexplored in the literature is the possibility that 
movements can also affect the opportunity structure (Gamson and Meyer, 1996).  
To understand the present opportunity structure in Alberta requires 
examining the management and regulation of agricultural labour and the 
development of agricultural production over time. It also requires identifying the 
key actors in the agricultural policy community and the nature of their political 
and economic relationships. Shields (1992) identifies agricultural workers, 
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farmers and agribusiness as key players. In addition, the federal and provincial 
governments affect agricultural employment through immigration and trade 
policy, agricultural subsidies and regulating the employment relationship. 
Labour groups represent both agricultural and other workers and seek to alter 
the legislative framework of employment. Finally, non-agricultural workers and 
employers may have an interest in the affect of employment regulation in 
agriculture because it may affect food prices. 
When discussing statutory employment rights, it is important to be 
mindful that, while these rights provide workers with benefits they do not have 
under the common law, these rights also reinforce the capital accumulation 
process and legitimize the existing social structure. They do this in part by 
channeling conflict into dispute-resolution mechanisms that are highly legalistic 
and where outcomes are highly individualized, thereby absorbing workers’ 
energy and resources while retarding their ability to resist systemic inequity and 
disadvantage (Hyman, 1989; Webber, 1991; Glasbeek and Drache, 1992). In this 
way, rule making is a strategy of power designed to perpetuate the 
subordination of labour to capital. This suggests that the relationship(s) between 
government and capital warrant careful consideration. It also suggests that 
access to statutory employment rights will not necessarily eliminate or remedy 
poor working conditions.  
 
AGRICULTURE EMPLOYMENT BEFORE THE SECOND WAR 
 
Agriculture played an important part in the settlement of the area that 
became the province of Alberta in 1905. In southern Alberta, ranching 
predominated, with many operations being large and commercial in nature. 
Grain farming increased in importance towards the beginning of the 20th 
century and was more often the preserve of smaller, family-based producers 
(Leadbeater, 1984; Monod, 1985). Paid labour, much of it migratory, was 
necessary for early agriculture in Alberta (and indeed Canada). Indeed, 
migratory workers received subsidized fares from railroads so that farmers could 
bring in the harvest that the railroads then freighted. 
Between 1890 and 1929, waged labour comprised up to 30% of Alberta’s 
agricultural workforce at harvest time and, in 1921, included nearly 17,000 
workers (Thompson, 1978; Haythorne, 1933; Macpherson, 1953). During the 
1920s, waged labour was the single greatest expenditure of Alberta farmers, 
requiring 8-19% of the value of agricultural products produced each year. By 
1931, approximately 5% of the 93,316 waged agricultural workers were year-
round employees (McGinnis, 1977). Thereafter, reduced demand for labour due 
to crop failures and the increased availability of local labour during the 
Depression negated the need for migratory labour until after the Second World 
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War, although local waged labour continued (Haythorne, 1933; Thompson and 
Seager, 1978).  
The peculiarities of agricultural production coloured labour-capital 
relationships on the farm. Workers were typically isolated from one another, 
living with and working alongside their employers. Further, the boundary 
between employer and employee was permeable (at least sometimes) with many 
workers being or expecting to become landowners themselves (Danysk, 1995, 
Parr, 1985; MacPherson and Thompson, 1989). The notion that waged 
agricultural workers might become farmers and the effect this had on how they 
viewed their employment relationship is intriguingly similar to the views of 
industrial workers before the nine-hour movement (Battye, 1978). Farmers and 
their hired hands may also have viewed farming as a lifestyle and calling, an 
affective orientation uncommon in industrial employment (Masson and Blaikie, 
1979). Further obscuring the differences between farmers and waged workers 
may have been the workers adoption of farm values, such as dissatisfaction with 
the effects of eastern financial interests and the capitalist system. 
Agricultural employment relationships were also affected by settlement 
policies. Small land allotments at a low price were attractive to under-capitalized 
farmers and resulted in significant immigration. This had several outcomes (that 
changed over time) that served the legitimation goals of (mainly) the federal 
government. It created opportunities for the children of central and eastern 
Canadian farmers (where land was become harder to acquire), it created a 
market for manufacturers’ goods, it enhanced Canada’s claim to these lands in 
light of American expansion, and it provided a place to send surplus British 
agriculturalists to (Fowke, 1946). The rapid expansion of small land holdings 
drove up the cost of labour but lured labourers seeking eventual landownership. 
The grain-based economy also created seasonal demands for workers (i.e., 
planting and harvesting). This allowed workers to homestead during non-peak 
periods, thereby reinforcing the dual identity of petite-bourgeois and labourer 
among some waged agricultural workers.  
One outcome of this arrangement was that agricultural labourers 
managed the conflicts of capitalist employment in different ways than did labour 
in industrial settings. Until after the First World War, the agricultural labour 
market was characterized by multiple employers, highly localized labour 
markets, short-term work, and significant time pressures generated by weather 
and the crop cycle. Workers generally advanced their interests individually, 
often by switching employers frequently to maximize earnings (Danysk, 1995). In 
this way, waged agricultural workers acted in a manner similar to workers in the 
resource extraction and construction industries.  
Farmers responded in various ways. Individual farmers might withhold 
some or all of a worker’s wages until the end of a contract or season (Danysk, 
1995). Collectively, farmers lobbied government to exclude farm workers from 
58   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society – Volume 14 – Autumn 2009 
employment statutes such as workers’ compensation (on the basis of the cost it 
would entail to farmers) and for wage regulation and a larger worker pool 
during the First World War (Thompson, 1978). Farm workers were excluded 
from the ambit of Alberta’s 1917 Factory Act and the 1922 Minimum Wage Board 
Act (Leadbeater, 1984). Farmers also colluded with one another (including one 
effort in 1920 under the auspices of the United Farmers of Alberta) and with 
provincial labour offices to set wages (Thompson, 1978). Thompson (1978) also 
notes that farmers were provided government manuals that encouraged farmers 
to withhold wage payments until the end of the harvest while the railways 
provided translations of stall tactics into eight languages. This allowed the 
farmer to alter the wage-rate bargain after the work had been completed. The 
time pressure of the harvest gave workers significant (if transitory) bargaining 
power that mitigated the success of these employer tactics. That said, the overall 
working and living conditions of wages labourers remained poor.  
The differing interests of farmers and labour were clear in the early 
political debates leading to the formation of the United Farmers of Alberta 
(UFA). Rennie (1998) documents a 1907 meeting between the more radically 
inclined Society of Equity (a farm organization) and the Trades and Labour 
Congress of Canada in which Henry Wise Wood (a prosperous farmer) argued 
that a convergence was not possible as farmers were both capitalists and 
employers. This more traditionally liberal view came to dominate the farm 
movement in Alberta. This view is also consistent with the master-and-servant 
tradition in employment relationships (Skogstad, 1979; Stirling and Conway, 
1992). 
Despite a strong community focus, UFA members frequently had an 
entrepreneurial outlook and this permeated the employment policies of the UFA 
government after 1921. For example, before taking office, the UFA voted down 
member demands for a minimum farm wage and creditor priority for worker 
wages. While in office, the UFA sought to establish a maximum farm wage rate 
in 1921. Yet the UFA should not be consider monolithic in its ideological outlook; 
as a product of several amalgamations, there were clear tensions within it. For 
example, more radical elements sought a labour-farm alliance to agitate for a 
redistribution of wealth and state involvement in industry (Rennie, 1998). 
Common interests between the liberal and radical wings of the party proved to 
be more important, though. UFA Premier Greenfield, for example, cited labour 
costs as a significant threat to farmers and the UFA typically avoided legislation 
and policy that entailed cost increases for farmers (Leadbeater, 1984), mirroring 
the pattern found in Ontario by Tucker (2006).  
While there were instances of consultation between organized labour and 
the UFA, cooperation was elusive. For example, the UFA declined to join the 
Alberta Federation of Labour and sought the continued exclusion of farmers 
from workers’ compensation legislation and from fortnightly wage payments to 
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workers. Yet, cooperation existed, including coordinated provincial and federal 
voting in Calgary, Drumheller and Medicine Hat (Finkel, 1985). As time went on, 
the UFA government demonstrated little sympathy with the concerns of labour 
in general, sanctioning enthusiastic police intervention in a 1932 hunger march in 
Edmonton and banning demonstrations in the Crow’s Nest Pass to dampen 
union activity among coal miners (Caragata, 1982).  
There was little evidence of sustained or widespread collective action 
among waged agricultural workers during this time. Unionization among beet 
workers was suppressed and a 1928 move to collective action (caused by the 
over-importation of British miners as agricultural workers) resulted in an 
immediate government response and deportation (Thompson and Seager, 1978; 
Thompson, 1978). Structural issues affected farm worker unionization in Canada. 
Migratory agricultural workers only assembled in large groups on trains, where 
the presence of railway police, poor conditions and the RCMP limited the 
potential for agitation. Workers were subsequently scattered in small groups to 
farms. The poor conditions were transitory (lasting only as long as the harvest) 
and workers could always leave and seek work from other farmers. Large farms 
(with larger groups of men) often had better than average wages and living 
conditions, thus reducing the likelihood of organization. Danysk (1995) notes 
that provincial and federal government also made significant efforts to disrupt 
union organization and used vagrancy laws to limit the willingness of workers to 
hold out for higher wages. The lack of interest in agricultural workers by more 
mainstream trade unions may reflect the difficulties existing unions faced in 
representing their own members in the face of employer and state resistance 
(Caragata, 1979). 
In summary, prior to the Second War, the federal government worked in 
conjunction with railways and farmers to ensure adequate waged agricultural 
workers were available to bring in the harvest. Federal settlement policies 
contributed to this goal and also met other political and legitimation objectives of 
the government. The provincial government did not include waged agricultural 
workers in the first statutory employment rights it enacted, partly in response to 
pressure from farmers. In this arrangement, we can see the seeds of two long-
term confluences of interest. First, farmers sought the assistance of the state to 
ensure adequate labour was available at minimal cost, with federal action 
addressing numerical adequacy and provincial (in)action addressing minimal 
cost. Second, capital cooperated with the state (via transporting workers) in 
order to profit from the food production process as well as ensure adequate 
supplies of food for industrial workers. We also see the absence of significant 
collective action among waged agricultural workers and repression (both by the 
state and employers) when it did occur. 
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AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT AFTER THE SECOND WAR  
 
The exclusion of agricultural workers from coverage under employment 
law continued in the lead-up to and after the Second World War. Although the 
Social Credit government of William Aberhart (1935-1943) enacted statutes 
addressing male minimum wages, hours of work, collective bargaining rights 
and (for coal miners) wage security acts, it excluded farm workers from their 
operation (Caragata, 1979). This exclusion continued under the governments of 
Ernest Manning and Harry Strom (1943-1971). Farm workers continued to be 
excluded from statutory employment rights under subsequent Progressive 
Conservative governments. 
The reason for the continued exclusion of agricultural workers by Social 
Credit governments is unclear. On possibility is that Manning’s political and 
religious views disposed him against limiting the power of capital in the labour 
market. This reflected Manning’s view of industrial unrest as part of a conspiracy 
to advance socialism as well as his belief that government intervention in the 
economy undermined individual’s pursuit of biblical salvation (Finkel, 1989). 
The outcome of this perspective included modification of labour laws to limit the 
ability of unions to organize, collectively bargain and strike as well as disinterest 
in the pro-employer bias of the Board of Industrial Relations (Finkel, 1988). When 
Manning’s pro-capitalist policies in pursuit of investment, something trade 
unionists often contend included a promise of labour peace to oil companies, was 
combined with the conservativism of the Industrial Federations of Labour of 
Alberta and the Alberta Federation of Labour during the late ‘40s and early ‘50s, 
there would seem to be no advocate of or rationale for statutory inclusion of 
waged agricultural workers (Caragata, 1979).  
During and immediately after the Second World War, farmers were not 
intensely politically active, in part because of internal divisions, rising incomes 
and the establishment of the Canadian Wheat Board (Skogstad, 1979 but see 
Monod, 1985 for one incident of collective protest). Farmers during the 1950s and 
1960s sporadically pressured government during times of economic stress but, in 
Alberta, typically had friendly relations with the provincial government and 
gained access to policy making (Skogstad, 1979). Post-war government 
agricultural policies sought to improve the competitiveness of individual 
producers, including state intervention in the market and the provision of 
financial aid (e.g., loans to increase the mechanization of farms) (Skogstad, 2007).  
In Alberta, the 1971 election of Peter Lougheed’s Progressive 
Conservative government saw significant agricultural policy changes, including 
a slow but deliberate erosion of the cooperative marketing structures for crops 
(Larsen, 2005). This process created additional opportunities for capital, while 
placing more financial pressure on farmers. Capital has also created quasi-
monopolies that supply producers with inputs and purchase their products, 
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thereby making farmers price takers. During the 1970s, meaningful policy access 
appears to be restricted to more conservative farm groups, such as Unifarm, 
which quietly advocated for farmers within the state’s market-driven policy 
framework. Since the 1980s, market-oriented strategies have been the main thrust 
of state policy (Skogstad, 1979, 2007). 
In the fields, the substitution of capital for labour (e.g., replacing the 
threshing machine with the combine) was a drawn-out process, spanning more 
than 30 years. Greater mechanization occurred during the same time as a 
transition towards fewer and larger farms and the development of non-family 
owned producer and processing facilities. McGinnis (1977) notes that the 
causality of this transition is unclear: was labour displaced by machines or was 
mechanization a response to a dwindling labour pool, or indeed some other set 
of pressures? Monod (1985) suggests that high wage costs and greater efficiency 
offered to larger farmer by mechanization made marginal farms uncompetitive 
given government policy emphasizing on low food prices during and after the 
second war. Those remaining farmers were drawn into the industrial economy as 
their capitalization increased. Skogstad (2007) asserts that that Agriculture 
Canada has historically argued for the national interest is best met (in part) by 
ensuring low-cost food is available.  
These changes are often cited as evidence that the “family farm” has 
given away to large “commercial farms”. These terms are difficult to define and 
it is more useful to note the broad trend on farms towards increased 
mechanization, size and specialization as a strategy to maintain farm viability. 
For example, since 1941 there has been a continuous decline in the number of 
farms and the continuous increase in the size of farms. Similarly, the percentage 
of Canadian farms reporting greater than $250,000 in farm receipts increased 
from 3% in 1981 to 17% in 2006, and this group of farms is responsible for 75% of 
all farm receipts (Canada, 2007a). 
These changes can be differentiated from the use of significant amount of 
waged labour managed by the farmer because the latter change alters the social 
relations of the undertaking. Typically the presence of five person years of 
waged labour is the threshold where past labour is likely to be more than just 
family members and the role of the farmer changes from performing to directing 
work (Ghorayshi, 1987; Winson, 1996). The use of waged labour may be 
negatively affected by mechanization and price pressure (Wall, 1994). This is not 
always the case, though. For example, some products are not amenable to 
mechanization. Historically, fruit and vegetable and poultry producers have 
been the most likely to hire significant waged labour, in part reflecting labour 
intensive (and often seasonal) operating patterns, while wheat, small grain and 
dairy farming operations have been much less likely to employ significant 
amounts of waged labour (Ghorayshi, 1987). It should also be noted that this 
pattern reflects historical contingencies and does not hold true throughout North 
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America. Yet reduced demand for labor combined with increasing land prices 
and start-up costs, has meant many potential farmers (who undertook waged 
labour in hopes of becoming farmers) sought employment in other industries 
(MacPherson and Thompson, 1989; Parr, 1985). Consequently, there have been 
shortages of labour.  
The federal government has taken a variety of steps to ensure an 
adequate supply of labour is available. This included making interned citizens 
and prisoners of war available as workers during the second war, and seeking 
European immigration after the war as well as encouraging mechanization. This 
pattern is evident, for example, Alberta’s sugar beet industry. The federal 
government facilitated the use of southern European immigrants in the 1920s 
and ‘30s, Japanese Canadians, German prisoners of war and conscientious 
objectors during the second war and European immigrant after the second war. 
When these sources proved inadequate, federal departments supplied 
(sometimes using financial coercion) aboriginal labour (Laliberte, 2006). 
Mechanization has reduced (but not eliminated) the need for manual labour. The 
three-tier system Shields posits for Canadian agriculture is evident in the sugar 
beet industry as is the pattern of producers maintaining profitability through low 
wages via the exclusion of workers from statutory rights (Laliberte and 
Satzewich, 1999). The wages and working conditions of field workers (who fall 
outside the ambit of employment legislation) have historically been poor while 
local sugar plant workers (unionized by UFCW) fall within the ambit of Alberta’s 
employment legislation. 
During the late 1960s, the federal government began facilitating the use of 
temporary foreign workers (normally from Mexico and the Caribbean) to 
address the shortage of Canadian farm workers. The government also developed 
(unsuccessful) manpower placement services for Canadian agricultural workers 
(Neilson and Innis, 1975). These programs primarily operate in Ontario but a 
small number of such workers can be found in Alberta. This suggests high-level 
continuity in the objectives of federal and provincial policies on waged 
agricultural labour after the second war, with federal policy adjusting both 
labour supply and demand to ensure numerical adequacy and provincial policy 
minimizing cost via continued statutory exclusion.  
The interaction of these agendas provides some explanation for the 
statutory exclusion of waged agricultural workers. The Government of Alberta 
has repeatedly justified not applying employment statutes to waged agricultural 
workers due to the expected cost associated with this change (Cardinal, 2006a, 
2006b; Horner, 2006; Stelmach, 2007). Then-Minister of Revenue Shirley 
McClellan (herself a farmer) explained refusing to extend health and safety 
regulations and mandatory workers’ compensation coverage to farm workers 
this way: 
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I know that if the producers, in their wisdom not ours, were to come 
forward in a majority view to the minister of agriculture, he would bring that 
forward to this table. He represents them extraordinarily well. But I must inform 
the hon. member, being a part of the agricultural community myself, that they 
are very independent thinkers, and they like to make their decisions and ask us 
to carry out policy they believe is in their best interest (McClellan, 2006).  
It is interesting to note that Alberta politicians identify farmers (instead of 
agribusiness) as the key source of pressure to exclude workers from statutory 
protection. This requires some consideration of how the interests of farmers, 
government and agribusiness are politically and economically intertwined in a 
way that results in the subordination of agricultural workers’ interests. At the 
core of this seems to be federal and provincial policy designed to ensure 
adequate and cheap food supplies exist, via the exclusion of waged agricultural 
workers from statutory employment rights and maintaining the availability of 
migrant workers. For example, in 2005, Canadian’s spent 9.3% of their disposable 
income on food and beverages, much less than in other western countries and 
down from 19.1% in 1961 (Shields, 1992; Canada, 2009). This policy requires 
farmers to adopt a low-wage strategy to manage the cost-price squeeze created 
by capital determining input and product prices. In this way, the state subsidizes 
the capital accumulation process by transferring part of the cost of social 
reproduction (i.e., food) to agricultural workers (Basran and Hay, 1988; Skogstad, 
1979). 
Farmers’ support places political pressure on the government to maintain 
the statutory exclusion by claiming they cannot afford the costs associated with 
the statutory floor of rights. The veracity of this claim is difficult to establish, but 
by making the claim, farmers create a political rationale for governments to 
maintain the status quo. For example, Alberta’s Premier sought to distinguish 
family and corporate farm when speaking on this topic, thereby appealing to the 
agrarian myth (see below) (Stelmach, 2007). In this way, concerns about the 
working conditions are displaced by concerns about farm bankruptcy. Farm 
bankruptcy is of concern to both farmers and residents of rural communities that 
are threatened by population loss due to urbanization. Farm bankruptcy has 
significant political poignancy in Alberta. Rural constituencies almost always 
elect Progressive Conservative candidates to the provincial legislature (Elections 
Alberta, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2008) and Conservative governments have ensured 
electoral boundaries are drawn so there are a disproportionately high number of 
rural ridings (Archer, 1993; Thomson, 2008). 
 
OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE 
 
This analysis suggests that the statutory exclusion of agricultural workers 
is one outcome of the interlocking economic and political interests of the state, 
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agribusiness and farmers. The key axes of interests appear to be the “cheap food” 
interest shared by capital and the state and the “farm viability” interest shared by 
the state and farmers. There appears little room in these relationships to advance 
an agenda of statutory inclusion because it runs contrary to both sets of interests 
and would disrupt a long-established “solution”: transferring costs to farm 
workers via low wages and poor working conditions facilitated by statutory 
exclusion.  
One potential line of fracture within the key actors in the policy 
community is between farmers, based on their degree of mechanization, size and 
specialization. The growing size of “average” farms mask diversity in the 
organization and size of farms. Larger farmers may operate in a more 
commercial and highly capitalized manner or, in some cases, operate farms as 
part of an integrated food production enterprise. Consequently, there may well 
be differing interests depending on the relative degree of (dis)advantage that 
various policies have. Within either of these groups is likely to be significant 
heterogeneity of views that may limit the value of farmers as allies to capital or 
labour. And the political power of less capitalistic farmers and their willingness 
to make common cause with waged agricultural workers is unknown (Stirling 
and Conway, 1988). 
The absence of powerful allies further limits the room for workers or 
labour groups to advance statutory inclusion. The government is capable of 
labour repression as evidenced by recent legislative moves against the interests 
of teachers (Reshef, 2007), health care (Fuller and Hughes-Fuller, 2005) and 
construction workers (Gilbert, 2007), but has not yet shown any interest in doing 
so to agricultural workers. This may be because the challenges mounted by 
agricultural workers have been too weak to merit any response beyond 
substituting the issue of farm bankruptcy.   
 
MOBILIZING STRUCTURES AND FRAMING PROCESSES 
 
While no significant study of mobilizing structures or framing processes 
has been undertaken, some observations may be useful in guiding future work in 
this area. The absence of collective resistance among farm workers is striking and 
worthy of research. It may be their mobilization potential is mediated by their 
(in)ability to identify and articulate common interests, see the existing system as 
amenable to change, and attract and deploy resources to pursue a change. A 
hostile opportunity structure and traditional barriers to collective action by 
agricultural workers also warrant consideration.  
Waged agricultural workers also face precarious employment conditions 
(making them vulnerable to employer pressure) and may lack the dense social 
network found where agricultural workers share a common cultural identity. For 
example, successful organizing campaigns among agricultural workers in British 
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Columbia and California have tapped into existing social networks based on pre-
existing and shared cultural identities (Bush, 1995; Jenkins, 1985). The only 
Alberta-specific study on social networks among agricultural workers is Smart 
(1998) and it does not provide much guidance. 
There is no data available about the composition of Alberta’s waged 
agricultural workforce. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are identifiable 
subgroups. These include aboriginal, non-aboriginal, and Mexican Mennonite 
workers with Canadian citizenship as well as Mexican and Caribbean seasonal 
workers and temporary foreign workers from elsewhere. The 2006 agricultural 
census provides no directly or indirectly applicable data (Canada, 2006a). The 
different citizenship status, cultural backgrounds and languages of each group 
may create barriers to mobilizing. Yet, within each group, existing social 
networks may be available for mobilization purposes. 
The aforementioned Farm Workers Union (FWU) is the only visible 
grassroots worker organization. As might be expected of a small and relatively 
new group, it has demonstrated limited policy capacity and saliency. For 
example, producer groups were able to thwart efforts by the Farm Workers’ 
Union and the Alberta Federation of Labour to get Employment Standards Code 
coverage for waged agricultural workers during a 2005 review (Canadian 
Federation of Independent Business, 2005). Whether the FWU can change to 
become more effective and representative is uncertain. The two other visible 
advocates for statutory inclusion are both labour groups (the AFL and the 
UFCW), neither of which has significant connections to Alberta agricultural 
workers or sway with the provincial government. It may well be that using 
traditional labour groups as a mobilizing structure or framing the issue as the 
absence of statutory rights are wrongheaded approaches to improving the 
working conditions of agricultural workers. Further, Butovsky and Smith (2007) 
argue that extending protective legislation and trade union rights has historically 
been an ineffective strategy to improve working conditions of exploited groups. 
Among the challenges facing farm workers is the use of the agrarian 
myth by the provincial government to justify continued statutory exclusion by, 
for example, substituting the issue of farm solvency for farm safety. This myth 
centres on the belief that farming is a virtuous activity that often entails personal 
sacrifice. Consequently, society is seen as owing farmers a social debt (Kelsey, 
1994; Rennie, 1998). This framing complements the more direct political power of 
over-represented rural voters by casting farmers as warranting special treatment. 
Similarly, many Albertans (including rural Albertans) consistently support 
governments that evince the neoliberal belief that government ought not involve 
itself in the operation of private businesses. That the exclusion of waged 
agricultural workers from statutory protection is a form of negative state subsidy 
to those agricultural producers who hire workers (i.e., larger producers) is either 
unclear or swamped by concerns about the financial viability of farms.  
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Further, the cheap food policy (including trade harmonization 
agreements) is actually a source of the financial pressure on farms and the 
government provides significant subsidies to the agricultural industry to 
maintain this policy. Consider, for example, the $460 million in federal and 
provincial financial assistance provided to ranchers during the Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak of 2003. This event was triggered by 
producers engaging in feed practices known to transmit the disease in order to 
minimize their costs (and failing to insure themselves against this outcome), 
behaviour encouraged by market pressures exacerbated by a cheap food policy, 
including trade harmonization agreements. 
 
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 
 
Despite the hostile opportunity structure suggested by this initial 
examination, there are some trends auguring in favour of statutory inclusion. 
Following Ontario’s 2006 inclusion of agricultural workers under occupational 
health and safety legislation, Alberta is now the sole province to deny 
agricultural workers basic statutory rights such as being informed of work-
related dangers and the able to refuse unsafe work. This inequity may be useful 
as a rallying point for farm worker advocates. A 2008 judicial inquiry (Alberta, 
2008c) into the death of farm worker Kevan Chandler saw the judge in the case 
recommended the application of occupational health and safety legislation to 
waged agricultural workers, noting that no party adduced evidence that 
provided a “…logical explanation… as to why paid employees on a farm are not 
covered by the same workplace legislation as non-farm employees” (p.6). The 
government has yet to outline any changes it is considering.  
The value of health and safety as a opportunity to lever change may be 
reduced by careful issues management. This topic is the subject of a separate 
study, but it is worth noting that Alberta’s government has tended to focus on 
education instead of enforcement as the (unsuccessful) remedy to the dangers of 
agricultural work. This approach is more palatable to farmers and assumes 
ignorance, not an economic incentive (or imperative), is the explanation for why 
farmers organize work in a hazardous manner. Another constellation of forces 
pressuring for OHS inclusion might be consumers and waged agricultural 
workers finding common ground around the issue of chemical use in food 
production. 
Recent Charter decisions may also influence agricultural workers’ 
statutory rights. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Dunmore and, subsequently, 
BC Health Services and Support decision have created an opportunity to 
challenge legislative exclusions that effectively preclude entire categories of 
workers from exercising their rights under s.2(d) of the Charter. In 2008, UFCW 
was successful at the Ontario Court of Appeal in having the Agricultural 
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Employees Protection Act struck down as unconstitutional. Whether the 
statutory exclusion of agricultural workers from labour law in Alberta so hinders 
these workers’ ability to engage in meaningful negotiations with their employer 
is unclear, but Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General) seems to clearly point in this 
direction. Unionization (or its potential) may cause employers to alter working 
conditions to head off organizing efforts. Yet the historical challenges of 
organizing farm workers remain.  
Alternately, farmers may react by increasing their use of migrant foreign 
workers, who are easier to control and have fewer rights than domestic workers. 
This may include altering the structure of work with an eye to making it 
undesirable to Canadian workers and then hiring migrant labourers through 
existing government programs. Although wheat farming on the prairies and 
vegetable farming in Ontario are very different forms of agriculture, the case of 
Ontario producers is instructive. Seeking a compliant workforce, these producers 
lobbied for and are now are structurally dependent upon migrant labour (Basok, 
2002). Assuming an adequate supply of appropriately skilled migrant workers 
was available, there would be few impediments to the adoption of a similar 
model in Alberta.  
The Alberta government has been highly supportive of the use of 
temporary foreign workers. In 2008, there were some 57,000 temporary foreign 
workers, a four-fold increase in five years.  This is a usage rate 20 times higher 
than US averages and 46.6% went to rural areas in 2007. Growing domestic 
unemployment in 2009 has resulted in a reduction in the number of high-skilled 
temporary foreign workers. Interestingly, the number of low-skill temporary 
foreign workers has not declined, suggesting the beginning of a permanent 
guest-worker underclass (Alberta Federation of Labour, 2009). 
The political power of rural voters may also be waning as population 
shifts require a redistribution of legislative seats. Careful boundary crafting may 
mitigate the speed at which rural power is reduced, but urban MLAs may be less 
individually susceptible to constituency pressure to maintain the exclusion and 
may be more susceptible to moral arguments about the inequity. That said, the 
continued importance of the Progressive Conservative party’s rural supporters 
make such a change difficult to move through caucus and cabinet. It is worth 
also worth noting that statutory rights are still only as effective as government 
enforcement and the willingness of farm workers to file complaints.  
A narrative that could be developed is one that links the low cost of food 
to exploitative working conditions for Canadians. Such narratives exist regarding 
“fair trade” coffee and the exploitation of agricultural workers in the developing 
world. Yet there are significant barriers to developing such a consciousness 
about food, which is not a luxury item: consumers may be simply unwilling to 
accept higher food prices on moral grounds. And, explaining the nature of the 
agribusiness (wherein farmers and waged agricultural workers are both subject 
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to exploitation by agribusiness) may obscure the role farmers play (as the 
employer) in this dynamic and even unintentionally bolstering the agrarian 
myth. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Analysis of the exclusion of waged agricultural workers from Alberta’s 
statutory framework governing employment relationships identifies the 
intertwining interests of government, farmers and capital as barriers to altering 
this arrangement. The interplay of these interests creates a dynamic that makes 
continued statutory exclusion a desirable policy for these stakeholders. 
Agricultural workers have historically had no meaningful access to provincial 
policy making and also lack powerful allies who might assist them in seeking 
statutory inclusion. Further, agricultural workers face a provincial government 
known for repressing labour groups and that routinely dismisses demands for 
statutory protection via issue substitution. 
It is unclear the degree to which external events can alter this opportunity 
structure. Trade unions may be able to use the government’s own emphasis on 
health and safety or the Supreme Court’s recent Charter decisions on collective 
bargaining to alter the rules. If agricultural workers were allowed to unionize 
(and unions sought to and were successful in unionizing them), this might alter 
the mobilization potential of the group. This was apparent in Ontario when the 
unionization of Cuddy Chicks and the Rae government’s agricultural collective 
bargaining legislation gave the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) a 
toehold in the industry and thus reason to fight for these workers.  
While UFCW has made significant effort on behalf of farm workers, 
particularly in Ontario, it is not clear whether there is broad interest among 
Alberta unions in social unionism, particularly given the barriers facing 
unionization drives even in established industries, the high servicing costs, and 
the limited potential farm units have to generate dues. This would be a useful 
line of inquiry in an examination of agricultural workers’ mobilizing structures. 
Whether that would create a meaningful opening in the opportunity structure or 
simply drive the existing policy actors closer together to defend their interests is 
unclear. The increasingly industrial organization of work in some segments of 
agriculture may also create conditions more amenable to traditional union 
organizing tactics. 
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